W
hether by government agencies or malicious hackers, surveillance of our electronic communications is a fact of modern life. There are often gray areas between legal and illegal surveillance, keenly exemplified by the controversial US National Security Agency's PRISM programdetails of which were leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013. Nevertheless, the technologies for communications surveillance continue to evolve.
Due to the ambiguous legal nature of such activities, the technologies that make them possible are seldom reported in the literature, making this topic a sensitive-if not tabooone in technical communities. Indeed, "security by obscurity" is still the mantra in mainstream computing, just as it was decades ago when the open source movement was gaining some traction. The community later realized that code quality could be more quickly improved if it was examined by both good and bad guys. We argue that this is also true for surveillance-through open discussions, "security by clarity" could help distinguish and diminish the gray areas between legal and illegal acts, and better protect individual privacy.
SURVEILLANCE CATEGORIES
Surveillance can be grouped into four distinct evolutionary groups: lawful surveillance, described in the Internet Engineering Task Force Request for Comments (IETF RFC) 3924 in October 2004; mass surveillance, as exemplified by many domestic and international government surveillance programs; wireless surveillance, or monitoring picked up through cellular networks, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth; and backdoor surveillance, which is done through malware in the form of backdoor programs on servers, desktops, laptops, smartphones, and tablets.
Typically, communications and privacy surveillance requires authorization through specific legal channels. In many countries, a court-issued warrant is required to conduct lawful surveillance-in cases in which the service provider intercepts traffic, such legal steps ensure compliance to RFC 3924. Mass surveillance expands lawful surveillance in terms of both target scale and technologies used. For terrorism protection, mass surveillance includes a significant portion of the global population; such programs require access through service providers, datacenters, and sometimes equipment vendors. The reach can also extend across borders with the help of allied countries and willing corporations. The wide spectrum of technologies enables data and metadata collection from datacenters and service providers; "contact chaining" through analyzing phone calls and email logs; data sharing among agencies and countries; financial monitoring; mobile phone-location tracking; infiltration of smartphones, datacenters, and networks; hotel-reservation monitoring; virtual reality surveillance (mostly using online gaming technology); and so on. Many aspects of these surveillance methods touch upon or are clearly in legal gray areas.
Wireless and backdoor surveillance techniques play a key role in mass surveillance programs, and are considered separately for their unique features. International Mobile Subscriber Identity (ISMI) Catcher, Femtocatch, and Bluejacking emulate base stations of cellular, femto, Bluetooth, or Wi-Fi to solicit associations from mobile stations, and then hack protocol messages to intercept and decrypt (or disable encryption of) user traffic. Nevertheless, wireless surveillance is limited to local geographical coverage. Backdoor surveillance uses a series of malware techniques, ranging from manually installed spyware and server and browser exploits to repackaged applications and documents. In its most sophisticated form, an advanced persistent threat (APT, which is when an unauthorized individual gains access to a network and remains there undetected for some time) describes the kind of event in which someone identifies a target's friends through a social network,
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sends them phishing emails with malicious URL links to exploit their browser, and then, on the exploited and infected host, repackages malware into a document that is then attached and emailed to the target. Relying on the trust between friends, the target then opens the attachment and his machine is infected with a back door without detection. The back door allows the undetected observer to conduct various kinds of tricksfrom data collection and exfiltration to wiretapping phone calls and tracking Internet access and activity.
IN THIS ISSUE
In this special issue, we sought to disseminate the latest communications and privacy surveillance methodologies and to present the state of the art in the field. We solicited a number of articles from leading scientists and practitioners in related fields and combined these with submissions we received through an open call for papers. All articles were read by multiple peer reviewers and went through rounds of revision. Upon completion of review and revision cycles, we accepted five high-quality articles for inclusion in the issue. In "Insecure Surveillance: Technical Issues with Remote Computer Searches," Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, and Susan Landau examine changes to the recently proposed US government rules for conducting remote computer searches. Through thorough examination of the legal proposals' potential issues, particularly as they apply to investigations, the authors demonstrate a clear potential to mistake innocent users for criminal actors. In addition, such searches can also lead to confusion between legitimate use of location-anonymizing software and nefarious activity. They assert that these proposed rule changes are likely to be damaging in that they can create serious security problems. The authors recommend changes in response to these proposals, and, although the article focuses on US law, the issues at stake are global.
Obviously, security mechanisms for phone calls are a hot topic in the communications surveillance field, as what is currently in place is inadequate and has limitations. There is a desperate need for better options. Steven J. Murdoch delves into this area in "Insecure by Design: Protocols for Encrypted Phone Calls." He explores how well the UK government's proposed voice encryption standard, MIKEY-SAKKE, protects phone conversations from eavesdropping. According to Murdoch, it fails to meet most of the criteria expected of a secure voice encryption standard, and fails to ensure user privacy at an acceptable level. Murdoch also provides suggestions for more robust communications security systems, including a voice encryption application called Signal.
In "Requirements Ana lysis RequiredOtherwise Targeted Monitoring Enables Pervasive Monitoring," Stephen Farrell discusses the paradox of targeted monitoring technology. In the author's view, without sufficient broad-based requirements analysis, such technology is easily co-opted for the purpose of pervasive monitoring, which could be considered an attack on lawful users. By openly reevaluating requirements put forward by privacy proponents, law enforcement, technologists, and commercial providers, Internet protocols could be designed to protect the privacy, safety, and longevity of the Internet itself.
Anonymous Internet communications are increasingly popular, and the Tor network is now the primary means for this. In "How Anonymous Is the Tor Network? A Long-Term Black-Box Investigation," Robert Koch, Mario Golling, and Gabi Dreo Rodosek adopt a black-box approach to examine the level of anonymity Tor provides. They investigated 1.5 years of data and focus on the kind of information a large ISP or an intelligence-gathering service can obtain. They discovered a significant imbalance between the number of theoretically available exit nodes and those actually used. Further, the exit nodes used belong to a very limited number of ISPs or have limited geographic spread, which makes data-collection and traffic-analysis attacks much easier.
Internet users come into relatively frequent contact with third-party online trackers collecting personal identifying information for building user profiles. In "Using Passive Measurements to Demystify Online Trackers," Hassan Metwalley, Stefano Traverso, and Marco Mellia present a detailed passive-measurement study to determine the extensiveness of these trackers. They counted more than 800 active trackers, of which 100 were regularly contacted by more than 40 percent of active users. The authors determined that the pervasiveness of trackers across the Web is high, whereas the use of privacyenhancing plug-ins is relatively infrequent (the authors have previously reported that just over 12 percent of households use anti-tracking plugins) and thus not protective. They propose further discussion of Internet privacy and an expansion of regulation on the use and control of thirdparty online trackers.
T
he research landscape in matters concerning the theme of this special issue is growing, and what is covered by the articles here is but a subset of the all topics. Nevertheless, we hope that these articles stimulate readers' ideas regarding communications and privacy under surveillance.
We thank all of the authors for their contributions to this special issue, and all of the reviewers for providing timely and useful feedback. We are indebted to Sumi Helal, Computer's editor in chief, as well as Allyson King, the peer review administrator, for their support in the preparation of this special issue.
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